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Commentary

An Incentives Approach to Patent
Settlements:
A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis &
Lemley
Maureen A. O'Rourket and Joseph F. Brodley tt
Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley have attempted
to clarify one of the most vexing issues facing antitrust and
intellectual property law today: What analytical framework
should antitrust authorities and courts use in considering
whether patent settlement agreements in infringement cases
violate the antitrust laws?' The issue is complex because many
ostensibly anticompetitive restraints in settlement agreements
are perfectly legal if the underlying patent right is valid.
Unfortunately, in some cases, the relevant patents are either
invalid or not infringed. 2 Thus, the antitrust analysis hinges
t Copyright © 2003 by MaureenP A. O'Rourke, Professor of Law, Boston
University School of Law. Professor O'Rourke is also Associate Dean for
Administration. The authors thank Mark Lemley for his comments and
Stephanie Smith for comments and research assistance.
tt Copyright © 2003 by Joseph F. Brodley, Professor of Law, Boston
University School of Law. Professor Brodley is the Frank R. Kenison
Distinguished Scholar of Law and Professor of Law and Economics.
1. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1725-28 (2003) . The Hovenkamp,
Janis, and Lemley analysis applies equally to copyright law. As they note,
however, the difficult cases are unlikely to be copyright ones. See id. at 173638. Thus, this Commentary concentrates only on patent settlement
agreements.
2. Estimates of the invalidity percentage vary depending on the time
period surveyed. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT 1135 (5th ed. 2001) (finding that the Federal Circuit held 72% of the

patents litigated before it valid and 28% invalid between the date of the court's
creation and the end of the year 2000); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
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on resolution of an intellectual property question.
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley rightly emphasize that in
many cases, the relevant decision maker can avoid evaluating
the validity of the intellectual property right at issue.3 Their
analysis is most interesting when it discusses those cases in
which validity of the patent right determines the lawfulness of
the settlement under the antitrust laws. 4 This Commentary
focuses on such cases.
Part I begins by discussing recent patent law reforms that
might help decrease the number of invalid patents the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) issues and also reduce the costs
associated with those invalid patents that do issue. These
changes include earlier publication of patent applications and
improved ability of third parties to initiate a patent
reexamination procedure. By decreasing the probability that
the holder of an invalid patent may use it to extract
anticompetitive settlement terms, such reforms may lessen the
need for antitrust scrutiny of patent settlement agreements.
Part II begins by noting the incentive distortions that
patent settlements can create in infringement disputes, and
suggests measures to counteract such incentive distortions and
to strengthen private incentives to challenge invalid patents.
Specifically, this Part suggests requiring disclosure to the
antitrust agencies of settlements that appear to create the
greatest antitrust risk, reinvigorating the longstanding rule
against licensee estoppel. We afso briefly discuss the merits of
awarding bounties for successful challenges to patent validity
and awarding attorney's fees to successful challengers.
Part III focuses on the analysis of settlements when
validity of the patent rights is uncertain. Concentrating

194-205 (1998) (surveying all final, written validity decisions from either the

district courts or the Federal Circuit from 1989-96, and finding that the courts
held 54% valid and 46% invalid); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and
Patent Standards:Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803,
822 & nn.71-72 (1988) (citing sources stating that appellate courts invalidated
nearly 66% of litigated patents between 1921 and 1973, while between 1982
and 1985, the Federal Circuit invalidated 44%); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does GeographicChoice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 889, 918 (2001) (surveying every patent case going to trial between
1983 and 1999, and finding that courts held 67% of the litigated patents valid
and 33% invalid).
3. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1723 & n.9.
4. See id. at 1725-27, 1734-65.
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particularly on the problem of exit payments, this Part
discusses different ways in which agencies not known for their
patent law expertise can determine the probability of patent
invalidity and the existence of an antitrust violation. The
alternatives include direct assessment of patent validity in the
antitrust proceeding, possible use of objective indicators to
determine patent validity, and a legal rule that would modify
the incentives of the economic actors to motivate them to act in
the public interest in settling patent infringement cases.
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley would combine the use of an
objective indicator-the exit payment-with direct assessment
of validity. We agree on the exit payment indicator, but would
opt for a legal rule that avoids the necessity of proving patent
validity.
I. PATENT REFORMS TO REDUCE INVALID PATENTS
Antitrust issues normally arise in patent infringement
settlements when patents are invalid or not infringed.
Antitrust problems could be greatly reduced by eliminating
invalid patents from the patent system. Thus, a threshold
question is whether patent reforms could eliminate or reduce
the large number of erroneously issued patents, and thereby
drastically reduce the need for antitrust scrutiny.
The PTO inevitably issues patents on inventions that do
not meet the statutory requirements for protection. 5 This is not
A system that never erred would be costsurprising.
prohibitive. 6 Thus, the issue is not whether policy makers can
construct a perfect system, but instead whether they can make
cost-effective improvements to the one that already exists.
Invalid patents impose costs on the public in the form of higher
prices and restricted output without the public's receiving the
benefit of the patent bargain-a new, useful, and nonobvious
invention. Recent enactments that require early publication of
the patent application and expand reexamination procedures

5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the invalidity rate
of issued patents).
6. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497, 1531-32 (2001) (arguing that because most

patents are neither litigated nor licensed, it is cheaper to determine validity in
those cases that do arise than invest in making the PTO's examination process
more accurate).
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should help to expose more invalid patents. 7 Congress and the
PTO should also consider whether other cost-effective reforms
exist that would enhance the probability that invalid patents
will not cause anticompetitive harms. Several steps have been
taken in this direction, and others are possible as we suggest
below.
A. PUBLICATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS
In the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,
Congress amended the Patent Act to provide for publication
(with certain exceptions) of a patent application eighteen
months after its filing.8 The PTO just recently implemented
the appropriate publication procedures, so it is too early to tell
how many inventors will stay in the patent system, particularly
when they have weak patent claims. Under the previous rule,
patent applicants could maintain their inventions as trade
secrets 9 throughout the application process (likely two to three
years). If an applicant never received a patent, it could still
retain trade secrecy protection for the invention. If the PTO
issued a patent, the publication that occurred on issuance
would void trade secrecy protection but the inventor would then
hold the patent along with its presumption of validity.' 0
Publication eighteen months after filing the patent
application, as the Act now requires, will void trade secrecy
protection before the applicant has obtained a patent."l Thus,
the new publication rule should force applicants to more
realistically assess their patentability prospects. Possibly then,
the PTO may issue fewer invalid patents because the
applicants themselves will remove weak applications from the
system rather than risk losing trade secrecy protection. Earlier
publication also provides third parties with an opportunity to
7. See infra notes 8-12, 15-19 and accompanying text.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
9. This assumes, of course, that the inventions met the requirements for
trade secret protection under relevant state law. Some would not, making
patent protection the only alternative available. Many, however, would
qualify as trade secrets, giving the inventors the option of choosing between
trade secret and patent protection.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (stating that a "patent shall be presumed valid").
11. Obviously, an invention may not be protected under trade secrecy law
if it is no longer a secret. See id. § 1839 (defining "trade secret" as information
that "derives independent economic value... from not being generally known
to ...

the public or other persons").
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challenge an application before patent issuance. For example,
third parties may provide prior art references of which the PTO
would otherwise be unaware. This should help the PTO to
make more informed and more accurate decisions on
patentability.
Unfortunately, these benefits may not be realized if nontrivial numbers of patent applicants take advantage of
statutory exceptions that permit "opting out" of the publication
requirement. Under the amended Patent Act, an application
will not be published "[i]f an applicant makes a request upon
filing, certifying that the invention disclosed in the application
has not and will not be the subject of an application filed in
another country, or under a multilateral international
12
agreement."
In a recent speech before the American Intellectual
Property Law Association, acting Assistant Attorney General
R. Hewitt Pate noted that even those who disagree on whether
there is a "'crisis' of too many patents too easily granted" can3
agree on certain desirable improvements to the system.'
Among these would be a mandate to publish all applications
within eighteen months after filing. 14 Certainly, the salutary
effect publication would have on the rate of issuance of invalid
patents is more likely to be realized if all applications, rather
than only selected ones, are published.
B. REEXAMINATION OF PATENT VALIDITY
The patent reexamination procedure offers another, albeit
post-issuance, method that helps to clear invalid patents from
the system.' 5 It permits anyone to petition the PTO to review
12. Id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i). The Act also provides that applications no longer
pending, those subject to a secrecy order, certain provisional applications, and
design patent applications will not be published. Id. § 122(b)(2)(A).
13. R. Hewitt Pate, Address Before the American Intellectual Property
Law Association (Jan. 24, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gove/atr/public/speeches
/200701.htm.
14. Id. Pate also noted that there is general agreement on a "mandate to
issue or deny patents within 18 months." Id. The effect such a requirement
would have on patent validity is debatable. Indeed, by forcing examiners to
rush their decisions, it may result in the PTO's issuing more invalid patents.
Further, it would remove any incentive for applicants themselves to remove
weak applications from the system because aligning the date of decision with
the date of publication means that applicants would no longer have to choose
between trade secrecy and patent protection.
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, 311-318.
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the validity of an issued patent if a substantial basis for
questioning the patentability of the invention arises after the
PTO issues the patent. 16 In the past, third parties rarely
sought reexamination because certain limits in the process17
made reexamination a risky procedure for the petitioner.
Specifically, third parties could not appeal an adverse decision
to the Federal Circuit and could not ask the examiner to review
prior art already submitted. 18 Recent changes removing these
limits should make reexamination a more viable option for
third parties.19
Some disagree, arguing that reexamination remains too
risky a strategy because the PTO effectively sits in review of
itself and is unlikely to reverse its own decision to grant a
patent. 20 The prospect of an appeal to the Federal Circuit may
not be sufficient to induce third parties to request
reexaminations in any significant number. 2' It is not to their
tactical advantage to be in the position of the "losing" party on
appeal. 22 Still, though, more reexaminations are likely to occur
than under the prior system. 23 The recent changes to the
reexamination process therefore appear to be a cost-effective
move toward removing at least some invalid patents from the
system.
The antitrust agencies might also consider whether they
16. Congress amended the Patent Act in 1999 to permit reexamination on
request by third parties. Id. §§ 311-318. For both applicant and third party
initiated reexaminations, the PTO Director is to "determine whether a
substantial new question of patentability.., is raised by the [reexamination]
request."
Id. § 303(a) (ex parte reexamination), 312(a) (inter partes
reexamination).
17. Jenna Greene, Streamlined: Law Reforming Patent, Trademark
Processes Likely to Get President's Signature this Month, DAILY BUS. REV.,
Oct. 15, 2002, at A7, 2002 WL 102273575 (noting that 1999 legislation
provided for third parties to participate in reexaminations but that the socalled inter partes proceeding had "been a complete flop-it has been used in
only three cases").
18. Id.

19.

Patent and Trademark Office Authorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.

107-273, §§ 13105-13106 (Nov. 2, 2002).

20. Mark A. Lemley, Remarks at the Symposium on the Interface
Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law, University of
Minnesota Law School, Feb. 8, 2003.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23.

See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing the changes

to the reexamination system).
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The Patent Act
should seek reexamination themselves.
provides for reexamination at the request of "any person," 24 a
term which presumably encompasses the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice (DOJ).2 5 Unfortunately, the agencies may lack the
resources and expertise to mount any meaningful number of
challenges.
In summary, the recent innovations regarding publication
and reexamination should result in a decline in the number of
invalid patents. In addition, the PTO and Congress ought to
consider whether additional cost-effective measures exist that
might further decrease the probability that the PTO will issue
invalid patents. For example, the PTO should continue to
scrutinize examiner compensation schemes with an eye toward
improving them in ways likely to lead to better PTO
performance.2 6 Nevertheless, as noted at the outset, the PTO
will inevitably issue some invalid patents, and it will do so even
if it and Congress take all possible cost-effective measures to
decrease the number of such patents. 27 Thus, publication and
reexamination will not be sufficient in themselves to remove
the need for more effective screening of patents and antitrust
scrutiny.
II. CHALLENGING INVALID PATENTS IN
SETTLEMENT CASES
The law generally favors settlements because they
conserve public administrative and judicial resources, and also
enable the parties to save time and expense, avoid the
uncertainty of a litigated outcome, and employ their resources
in other productive ventures. 28 The same considerations apply
to patent infringement cases, which can be extraordinarily
complex, lengthy, and expensive.
Without settlement, the alleged infringer risks entry of a
permanent injunction restraining it from marketing its product
24. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2000).
25.

Lemley, supra note 20.

26. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform,
14 BERK. TECH. L.J. 577, 606-09 (1999) (suggesting, inter alia, higher salaries
for senior examiners and redesigned bonus systems).
27. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text.
28. See e.g., Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1721.
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(and recouping the costs already expended in its development)
until the patent's expiration, and a judgment ordering payment
of damages in the amount of the patentee's lost profits plus
interest and costs. 29 The patentee in turn risks a finding of
invalidity or noninfringement-a finding that is particularly
30
costly to the patentee because it operates against the world.
All comers, not just the defendant, may now practice the
invention without compensation to the patentee.
Patent settlement agreements can also benefit consumers.
Settlement agreements are often pro-competitive. For example,
when they enable market entry or provide for cross-licensing of
settlement
and blocking technologies,
complementary
agreements can lead to the adoption of more efficient
production techniques.
Consumers may benefit from the
resulting availability of more output at lower prices.
Settlement, however, dramatically changes the incentives
of the patentee and alleged infringer. Prior to settlement, the
parties' interests are adverse, and that adversity promotes the
public interest in policing patent validity. After settlement, the
parties' interests are congruent: Both seek to extend the patent
3
to its broadest possible scope regardless of its enforceability. '
This alignment of incentives is particularly dangerous when
the alleged infringer is one of only a few likely to challenge the
patent. As Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note, a
patent settlement agreement can effectuate a cartel or create or
32
maintain a monopoly in an innovation or product market.

A.

NOTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENTS

The secrecy of settlement agreements makes it difficult for
antitrust enforcers to uncover possible violations and to know
whether anticompetitive settlements are widespread. To be
sure, as Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley explain, section 135(c)
of the Patent Act requires the filing of interference settlements

29. 35 U.S.C.

§ 283-84.

30. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 32850 (1971) (holding that a patentee may not assert validity of a patent
previously declared invalid by a federal court in a suit against a different
defendant unless the patentee can show lack of a full opportunity to litigate
validity in the prior suit).
31. See, e.g., Robert J. Hoerner, Antitrust Pitfalls in Patent Litigation
Settlement Agreements, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 113, 114 (1998).
32. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1739-65.
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and collateral agreements with the PTO. 33 The PTO, however,
does not make a finding of validity when it accepts a section
135 filing. It will send copies of filings to the FTC on request,
allowing the FTC to assess whether the settlement implicates
antitrust concerns. The FTC, however, does not receive notice
of what filings have occurred, making it virtually impossible for
it to request copies of filings that might be of interest. In
addition, antitrust authorities lack standing to enforce
compliance with section 135(c). 34 For these reasons, some
believe that non-compliance with that section's requirements is
35
widespread.
Furthermore, patent interference settlements represent
only a subset of patent settlement agreements. An interference
proceeding is one between two applicants to determine
priority. 36
Many settlements arising from infringement
litigation do not involve interference proceedings. Currently,
there is no requirement that parties file settlement agreements
not involving interference proceedings with any enforcement
agency.
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note that then-acting

33. Id. at 1734 & n.50.
34. United States v. FMC Corp., 717 F.2d 775, 780-87 (3d Cir. 1983)
(employing the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78-85 (1975), and holding that no implied right of action in favor of
the United States exists to permit it to enforce 35 U.S.C. § 135(c)).
35. See Joel L. Klein, Address Before the American Intellectual Property
Law Association
(May 2,
1997), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/]1 23.htm. Klein noted that § 135(c)'s filing requirement was intended
to deter anticompetitive agreements but also stated,
I still can't help but wonder whether the statute is fully effective in
ensuring filings.
The PTO is not in a position to police the
requirement that there be no unfiled side agreements. Nor are third
parties ....
And [the] only way we're likely to find out about a failure
to file is through serendipity in an already-opened investigation....
What this means, then, is that the only people who are likely to know
about a violation of Section 135(c) and to be able to do something
about it are the parties to the settlement themselves ....
[T]o hinge
law enforcement on changes of heart by violators places more hope in
redemption of the human spirit than one in my position can afford to
have.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2000) ("Whenever an application is made for a
patent which, in the opinion of the Director, would interfere with any pending
application, or with any unexpired patent, an interference may be
declared .... The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine
questions of priority of the inventions and may determine questions of
patentability.").
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Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein proposed a
prenotification system for patent cross-licenses to permit
merger review (since patent cross-licensing involves an
acquisition of assets subject to the Clayton Act). 37 It is
important to add that at the same time Klein also proposed a
similar notification system for settlements of infringement
disputes. 38 This proposal deserves careful attention because it
would help dispel the secrecy that prevents antitrust
authorities from identifying and understanding the extent of
anti-competitive settlement agreements. Indeed, only a year
before, William Baxter, a former assistant attorney general for
antitrust, had indicated agreement with such a proposal. 39
In his proposal, Klein identified an essential problem: A
broad range of agreements-from licenses to cross-licenses to
settlements-simply escape the attention of antitrust
regulators. 40 He suggested that rather than requiring that all
such agreements be filed, antitrust authorities should start by
requiring notification of a limited category of infringement
cases. The authorities could monitor the cases, and either
assume the defendant's role if they believe a settlement is anticompetitive, or provide the court with comments. With the
benefit of information provided by the antitrust authorities,
courts might be better equipped to reject a settlement against
41
the public interest.
To avoid unduly burdening settling parties, the Klein
proposal would require filing of only those settlements that
meet specified criteria. Without explicitly defining these
criteria, Klein enumerated the factors that might be
considered. These included (1) the size of the parties, (2) their
share of the relevant market, and (3) the economic significance
of the infringement and the products and services involved.
Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley's analysis
suggests an additional general criterion that antitrust

37.
38.
39.

Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1734 n.51.
Klein, supra note 35.
See William F. Baxter, Comment, in COMPETITION POLICY AND

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS

IN

THE

KNOWLEDGE-BASED

ECONOMY

(Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998); see also Klein, supra note
35 (arguing for a notification system and noting that "Bill Baxter made a
similar proposal just last year").
40. See Klein, supra note 35.
41. Id.
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authorities might utilize in defining the scope of notification:
products that rest on only one basic patent ("single product
patents").4 2 They note that settlements involving single
product patents are less likely to be pro-competitive by
removing blocks to further innovation. 43 This suggests that
settlements involving single patent products may raise greater
antitrust risks, an inference strengthened by the fact that
patents contribute most to profits in such single product
44
industries as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and agriculture.
Consistent with Klein's proposal, Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley's analysis also suggests that market power in the
product or innovation market is another criterion important to
the likelihood of an anti-competitive settlement. 45
Any
notification system should therefore also set a threshold level of
market power or market share that would trigger the filing
requirement.
The Klein proposal may encourage parties to enter into
less restrictive settlement agreements. Parties may do so to
avoid the filing requirement, a viable option particularly if
certain types of provisions give rise to a need to file. Finally,
only by obtaining a more complete picture of the nature and
terms of patent settlement agreements may antitrust agencies
obtain a realistic view of the extent of anticompetitive behavior
in such agreements. The debate should therefore focus less on
whether notification is desirable and more on how to define the
subset of settlement agreements to which such a requirement
would apply.
Consideration of a settlement notification
procedure is further illuminated by a proposed settlement
disclosure form in a recent article by Robert Hoerner, a former
Chief of the Evaluation Section of the DOJ's Antitrust
46
Division.
The Klein proposal to enable the antitrust authorities to
effectively challenge patent settlement agreements also helps
to alleviate the free rider or "public goods" problem associated

42.

Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1738.

43.

Id.

44. Fed. Trade Comm'n/Dep't of Justice Hearings on Competition and
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-based Economy: A
Competition

View of Patent

Settlements

(May 2,

http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020502trans.pdf.
45. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 1, at 1728.
46.

See Hoerner, supra note 31, at 135-38.

2002), available at
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with patent litigation. As noted above, a patent invalidity
finding functions in favor of the world (including the
defendant's competitors), not just the defendant who financed
the litigation. 47 These competitors do not have to compensate
the successful defendant for this benefit. As Attorney General
Klein stated, allowing antitrust authorities to present
arguments to a court overcomes the problem of defendants'
limited resources and skewed enforcement incentives:
If [the antitrust agencies had a] right to be heard, we could ensure
that meritorious defenses would not be abandoned, and questionable
intellectual property claims would not triumph, without at least an
opportunity for us to consider whether broader societal interests in
competition warrant putting the claims to their proof, and to bring
those considerations to the court's attention. Then, those broader
interests would not be held hostage to the defendant's own economic
interests, which may be subject to limited resources for litigation and
a strong aversion to the consequences of defeat, no matter how remote
the chances....
[Wihenever there is even a more than trivial possibility of
infringement, the costs of litigation skew the parties' decisions,
steering them away from a serious test of the bounds of the rights of
the patentee. . ., and towards agreements that too often make
teammates out of rivals. Since society picks up the tab for these
agreements over the long run, I think it may be worth an investment
of our resources up front to head them off where necessary. 8

B.

MAINTAINING PRIVATE INCENTIVES TO CHALLENGE PATENTS:
BOUNTIES, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND LICENSEE ESTOPPEL

Paying bounties to those who successfully challenge patent
validity also provides an alternative means of strengthening
private incentives to challenge patents. 49 A bounty, of course,
47. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
48. Klein, supra note 35, at 19-20.
49. FTC/DOJ Continue Hearings On Antitrust/Intellectual Property, 82
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 442 (May 17, 2002). In the joint FTC-DOJ
hearings, Professor Joseph Scott Miller suggested
a bounty mechanism that operates after a successful challenge has
been mounted. Such a bounty should include disgorgement to the
infringer [ofi all the profits the patentee earned by using the invalid
patent and would be available to only the first accused infringer to
obtain a final judgment that the patent is invalid or unenforceable.
Id. at 444; see also John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the
Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 34052 (proposing that the PTO award prior art informants with a bounty assessed
against applicants, thus "restoring order to our patent system and ultimately
lowering its social costs").
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would increase the expected return to challenging a patent.
Such an idea, while theoretically sound, faces a host of practical
questions: Who funds the bounty, calculates its amount, and
pays for administration of the system?
A second alternative would be to award attorney's fees to
those who mount successful challenges to patent validity. The
Patent Act already authorizes an award of attorney's fees in
"exceptional cases,"50 but could be amended to require an
award whenever a court holds the patent invalid. Mandatory
attorney's fees for successful challengers may not be ideal,
however, because they could discourage enforcement of valid
patents due to the patentee's "strong aversion to the
consequences of defeat no matter how remote the chances," as
already alluded to by Attorney General Klein.
Thus,
mandatory award of attorney's fees to the successful challenger
might further inhibit patentees, who would face the double risk
of an erroneous invalidity finding and liability for attorney's
fees. Requiring filing of certain agreements with existing
agencies, and providing those groups with enhanced abilities to
intervene in proceedings may be a less expensive and more
evenhanded way to monitor anticompetitive settlements.
A third alternative to maintain private incentives to
challenge patents is to maintain the Supreme Court's rule
5
against licensee estoppel enunciated in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins. '
There, the Court recognized that "[1]icensees may often be the
only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge
the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are
muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute
52
to would-be monopolists without need or justification."
Moreover, as discussed below, antitrust authorities face
difficulties in assessing patent validity in settlement cases
since the parties with the best information are those who have
just settled.
Unfortunately, as Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley observe,
the Federal Circuit has been "chip[ping] away" at this rule for
some time. 53 In Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., for example, the
50. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
51.

395 U.S. 653, 668-75 (1969).

52. Id. at 670.
53. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1743 n.99; see, e.g., Foster v. Hallco
Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 474-77 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that where litigation
was concluded by entry of a consent decree acknowledging patent validity,
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court distinguished Lear as a case that involved neither
settlement nor a promise by the settling party not to challenge
validity.5 4 The Flex-Foot court explained,
Once an accused infringer has challenged patent validity, has had an
opportunity to conduct discovery on validity issues, and has elected to
voluntarily dismiss the litigation with prejudice under a settlement
agreement containing a clear and unambiguous undertaking not to
challenge validity ...the accused infringer is contractually estopped
55
from raising any such challenge in any subsequent proceeding ....

At least one textbook cites Flex-Foot as standing for the
proposition that "a promise not to challenge the validity of a
patent will be enforced if it is in a contract of a certain type,
which
presently
includes
settlement
agreements."5 6
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley appear to agree with this
restrictive reading of Lear, noting that "in any event, [the Lear]
law does not permit a licensee who once challenged a patent's
57
validity and settled that lawsuit to reopen the challenge."
If this, indeed, is what the Federal Circuit intends, it has
gone too far in limiting Lear's holding.
Certainly,
considerations of res judicata, finality, and preventing a
settling party from engaging in successive holdups by reopening validity challenges represent important public
interests, but the public also benefits from removing invalid
patents from the system.
Therefore, the Flex-Foot rule should be read literally:
There, the court emphasized that the parties had an
opportunity to conduct discovery.5 8 Presumably, such discovery
is likely to reveal much about probable patent invalidity. A
limited rule permitting a settling party to re-open validity
challenges when discovery has not occurred may be
appropriate. Such a rule might be further limited by allowing
re-opening of a settlement only when no other party is likely to
policies favoring finality ofjudgments and encouraging settlement outweighed
those motivating the Lear Court); Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348,
350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that where a court's settlement order
dismissed the litigation and indicated that validity issues were finally
concluded, the settlement order barred a later challenge to validity by the
settling party under principles of res judicata).
54. 238 F.3d 1362, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 1370.
56. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1142 (2d ed.
2001).

57.
58.

Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 1, at 1739 n.99.
See Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370.
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challenge the patent. In such cases, the policies underlying res
judicata and finality should yield to that of sheltering the
public from unwarranted patents and monopolies.
III. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF PATENT SETTLEMENTS
WHEN VALIDITY IS UNCERTAIN
Antitrust analysis of patent settlement agreements
presents no special difficulty when it is certain that the patent
rights are either valid or invalid, as Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley clearly observe. The evaluation problem arises when
the settlement agreement would violate the antitrust laws in
the absence of valid patent rights and the validity of these
rights is uncertain. 59 The issue has come to a head in recent
pharmaceutical cases involving settlements between producers
of established "pioneer" brands and generic substitutes.
In these cases antitrust legality has frequently focused on
the issue of so-called exit payments or reverse payments under
which the generic producer agrees to delay or even forgo
competitive entry in return for a large payment from the
pioneer. If the patent rights are valid, the settlement is likely
to be lawful because, as Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note,
in that event the settlement is "[no] more anticompetitive than
a likely outcome of the litigation." 60 Similarly, if the patents
are invalid or not infringed, the settlement agreement will most
likely be unlawful. But in fact, often the validity of the patent
rights is unclear.
The difficult question posed in the
pharmaceutical cases is how the issue of antitrust legality is to
be resolved when patent rights are uncertain.
At least three alternatives appear possible. First, the
antitrust court (or agency) could attempt to assess patent
validity directly.
Second, the court could use objective
indicators to determine validity. Third, the court could adopt
an incentive-modifying legal rule that would motivate the
patentee and alleged infringer to act in the public interest, and
thereby remove the need for the antitrust court to determine
patent validity. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley propose a
combination of the first and second alternatives.
59. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 1, at 1728-39. The uncertainty may go
either to patent validity or infringement.
60. Id. at 1727. The settlement must also be a reasonable accommodation
of the patent right. Id.
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Specifically, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley propose a twopronged test under which exit payments would be
presumptively illegal unless the infringement plaintiff shows
"both (a) that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its
infringement lawsuit is significant; and (b) that the size of the
payment is no more than the expected value of litigation and
collateral costs attending the lawsuit." 61 While we agree that
an exit payment from the patent holder to an alleged infringer
is a key indicator of questionable patent rights, we would
exclude any requirement that patent validity be determined or
estimated in an antitrust proceeding.
Instead, in cases
involving reverse payments we would rely primarily on the
third alternative-private market forces operating under an
incentives-modifying legal rule. Turning to the second prong of
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley's affirmative defense, we agree
that the payment by the infringement plaintiff of no more than
its expected litigation costs would be permissible. We have
doubts, however, about inclusion of "collateral costs."
Defendants in pharmaceutical cases have been quite inventive
in enlarging collateral cost claims to include a range of costly
62
uncertainties that they claim patent litigation introduces. It
is difficult to conceptualize a workable rule that will
appropriately
distinguish
between
"permissible" and
"impermissible" collateral costs.
A. DIRECT ASSESSMENT OF PATENT VALIDITY

The most straightforward approach might appear to be for
the court and the enforcement agencies to directly assess the
validity of the patent rights. The proposal is not that the
antitrust court should undertake a full patent adjudication, but
that it should assess the probability that a patent court would
hold the patent rights to be valid. Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley would simplify the inquiry by requiring only a
determination whether the probability is "significant," but any
approach that would require an antitrust court or agency to
determine patent validity raises a number of questions.
Determining patent validity in an antitrust proceeding
61. Id. at 1759.
62. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682,
703-05 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (discussing and rejecting the defendants' claim that
the settlement agreement was functionally equivalent to a court-ordered
preliminary injunction).
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would greatly complicate antitrust litigation. The enforcement
agencies lack expertise in patents.
Their jurisdiction
encompasses far too many industries for them to gain technical
competence over the range of expected cases. Moreover, the
agencies must often act within strict time constraints, which
challenge them even when the issues include only antitrust
matters. The parties with the greatest knowledge of the factsthe patentee and the infringer-are biased against the
government or private antitrust plaintiff since both now seek to
uphold the patent. Further, the issue to be decided by the
antitrust court is inherently ambiguous: What is a "significant"
probability of validity? 15%? 35%? 51%? What effect would
determination of significant probability by an antitrust court
have on subsequent patent validity litigation?
Indeed,
antitrust judges may be reluctant to second-guess how a patent
court might rule in a pending infringement case. Finally, the
antitrust enforcement agencies have to our knowledge
uniformly maintained that patent validity determination in an
63
antitrust case is not feasible.
These issues could conceivably be overcome if the antitrust
suit could be consolidated with the patent infringement
litigation. In fact this has effectively been accomplished by one
government agency, the International Trade Commission (ITC),
but is unlikely to be effective under the quite different
conditions of an antitrust case. The ITC has long evaluated
patent validity in the context of infringement complaints under
the Tariff Act (called a "section 337" proceeding). 64 A section
337 proceeding involves the patentee, the alleged infringer, and
an ITC attorney, and moves quite rapidly. 65 The ITC must
63. See generally Fed. Trade Comm'n/Dep't of Justice Hearings on
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-based
Economy: A Competition View of Patent Settlements (May 2, 2002) and
Practical Issues Encountered in Antitrust Analysis of Licensing Practices: The
Problem of Dealing with Uncertain or Disputed Patent Rights (May 14, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm.
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000). The ITC has been evaluating patent validity
since at least 1974 when Congress passed the Trade Reform Act, which
amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to allow the ITC to consider issues of patent
invalidity and unenforceability.
Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress
Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996). We are indebted to
David Balto for suggesting this alternative.
65. Telephone Interview with Ralph Mittelberger (July 26, 2002) (noting
that discovery, trial, and decision by an administrative law judge takes about
thirteen months, with the ITC decision likely following less than six months
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approve any settlement as consistent with the public interest. 66
An informal survey revealed that in fiscal year 1998, twenty-six
of twenty-nine section 337 investigations concerned an
allegation of patent infringement. 67
Of the fifteen
investigations terminated by the ITC in 1998, eight were
terminated by settlement or withdrawal of the complaint, three
were held to be violations, and four were dismissed either
68
because the patent was invalid or not infringed.
It would be difficult, however, to transfer the ITC system to
domestic antitrust enforcement. The ITC heavily relies on the
69
parties to the section 337 proceeding to develop the evidence.
In the ITC proceeding, the parties are adversaries. In contrast,
parties to a patent settlement agreement would be allies,
placing the full burden of patent litigation on the FTC staff, a
difficult challenge particularly in the absence of additional
resources. 70 Moreover, the FTC probably could not adopt the
ITC approach without statutory amendment giving it the power
to sit as a patent court.
B. OBJECTIVE INDICTORS OF PATENT VALIDITY
As an alternative to adopting an ITC system for direct
determination of patent validity in antitrust cases, antitrust
regulators could attempt to identify proxies for patent
validity-objective criteria or behavioral conditions that make
economic sense only if the patent rights are invalid. As
discussed, exit payments are a key indicator and point to
illegality if the payment exceeds litigation costs-although
commentators differ on the strength of the inference to be
drawn. In addition, courts and enforcement agencies might
focus on behavioral indicators such as continued competition by
the alleged infringer, continued purchasing by customers aware
of the infringement claims, and willingness of the alleged

later).
66. William P. Atkins, Appreciating337 Actions at the ITC: A Primer on
Intellectual Property Issues and Procedures at the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 5 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 103, 110 (1996).
67. Memorandum from Stephanie Smith (July 15, 2002) (on file with
authors).

68. Id.
69.
70.

Telephone Interview with Ralph Mittelberger, supra note 65.
Id.
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infringer to indemnify its customers. 7 1 Such commitments by
industry participants, when they are made, point toward likely
invalidity. But most frequently, such evidence is unlikely to be
available.
Infringers will not lightly assume the risk of
damages, or even treble damages, if the patent rights are
upheld.
A quite different indicator, suggested by George Priest,
may help to identify disguised cartels without directly
answering questions of patent validity. In his article, Cartels
and Patent License Arrangements, Professor Priest attempted
to identify cartels by focusing on royalty-free licenses and other
72
market indicators in industry-wide licensing arrangements.
His work foreshadowed the reverse payment cases, observing,
"It is inconsistent for a licensor to allege that it is maximizing
the return from its invention by controlling price and output if
it charges no royalty. The same conclusion follows from
evidence of royalty rebates or from otherwise unaccountable
cash payments from the licensor to the licensee." 73 He
emphasized that antitrust enforcers should monitor the
relationship between price and royalty as well as output and
market share, drawing "unambiguous inferences" from how
these metrics behave. 74 For example,
[w] here a patent license involving competing firms increases the price
of a product without substantially altering the product itself, the
license is illegitimate....
Where a patent is alleged to reduce manufacturing costs, the royalty

should approximate the scale of the alleged cost reduction ....
[W]here there is unexpected competition subsequent to the execution

of the license, price cannot fall by more than the royalty unless the
licenses are illegitimate ....

[Elvidence that licensees ...

have reduced or ceased production

71. See Professor Joseph Farrell, Testimony at Fed. Trade Comm'n/Dep't
of Justice Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy
in the Knowledge-Based Economy: A Competition View of Patent Settlements
(May 2, 2002) and Practical Issues Encountered in Antitrust Analysis of
Licensing Practices: The Problem of Dealing With Uncertain or Disputed
Patent Rights (May 14, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/

020514trans.pdf; cf.United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 193-95 (E.D.
Penn. 1956) (finding a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
noting that when the infringement defendant "showed any aggressiveness in
the defense," the patentees abandoned suit to avoid adjudication of validity).
72. George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangement, 20 J.L. &

ECON. 309, 326-30 (1977).
73.
74.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 329.
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because of higher costs suggests that the licensees are not receiving
cartel rents .... More generally, evidence over time of significant

variation of
market shares among licensees strongly suggests
75
legitimacy.

Since this approach does not require evaluation of patent
validity, it provides a potentially useful tool to identify
settlement agreements that are in fact disguised cartels.
C. INCENTIVE MODIFYING APPROACH

The basic problem in the reverse payment cases involving
the pharmaceutical industry is the skewing of competitive
incentives
between brand name and generic drug
manufacturers, which causes them to become collaborators
rather than rivals in vindicating their patent rights. When
these rights are invalid, the public interest suffers. Responding
to this concern, the authors of this Commentary have argued
that settlement agreements in Hatch-Waxman Act cases should
be limited to delayed entry by the generic producer (and of
course may also provide for payment of royalties by the generic
manufacturer).76 This provides a clearly less restrictive
alternative to a settlement involving a reverse payment. The
authors have also advocated adoption of at least a rule of
presumptive illegality as to such payments, with the burden on
the parties to justify the payment, 77 and the allowable defenses
should be limited to litigation costs.
With these measures in place, the government or private
plaintiff then would not have to prove patent validity, and the
clarity of the rule would likely induce more pro-competitive
settlement agreements.
The parties with the best
information-the patentee and alleged infringer-would use
their own estimates of validity to negotiate a settlement within
bounds. A weak patent would face little entry delay while a
strong patent would face longer delay. "Limiting the 'coin' of
settlements to delayed entry and the royalty to be paid is vastly
superior to requiring proof of patent invalidity .... [It] removes
the incentive distortion involved in reverse payments [and]
provides the legal rule ... most likely to lead to effective
75. Id. at 327-28.
76. Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A. O'Rourke, PreliminaryViews: Patent
Settlement Agreements, ANTITRUST, Summer 2002, at 53, 55 (noting that FTC
Commissioner Leary advocates such an approach).
77.

Id.
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administration and minimal antitrust regulation."7 8
CONCLUSION
Identification and policing of anticompetitive settlement
agreements challenges legal ingenuity. This Commentary has
suggested that viable strategies include taking cost-effective
measures to decrease the number of invalid patents issued,
implementing a notification requirement for patent settlement
agreements, providing incentives to litigate validity, and
permitting certain parties to re-open validity challenges after
settlement. The Commentary has also evaluated alternative
ways for antitrust agencies and courts to confront the problem
of assessing patent validity in settlement cases. We agree with
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley on the need for at least a rule
of presumptive illegality against exit payments in settlements.
We would rule out, however, any justification for an exit
payment-apart from savings in attorney's fees-based on
assessment of patent validity. Instead, we would rely on the
less restrictive alternative of limiting the settlement terms to
deferral of entry and the amount of the royalty to be paid by
the licensee.

78.

Id at 56.
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